Files
Netcatty/infrastructure/services/syncSignature.test.mjs
T
陈大猫 db69d5ac39 [codex] Harden sync overwrite protection and add local restore history (#720)
* fix: harden sync overwrite recovery

* refactor: separate backup retention settings

* refactor: align backup retention controls

* refactor: simplify backup retention card

* fix: address PR #720 deep-review findings

- Close the cross-window restore race by holding a time-bounded barrier
  in localStorage during every destructive apply; useAutoSync skips
  pushes while it's set, preventing a pre-restore snapshot from
  clobbering just-restored cloud data.
- Round-trip startup three-way merges so merged-in local additions
  actually reach the cloud instead of living only on the device that
  ran the merge until the next edit.
- Upgrade sync signatures from a 64-char ciphertext prefix to full
  SHA-256 (v3), closing the tail-mutation replay weakness.
- Harden the vault-backup IPC: payload size cap, enum-validated reason,
  sanitized version strings, strict maxCount, concurrent-call mutex,
  monotonic createdAt to avoid same-ms ordering ties.
- Extract the anchor-change decision into a pure module with unit tests
  covering no-anchor, resource-id drift, and signature mismatch paths.
- Capture the protective backup from the pre-apply closure snapshot so
  it reflects what's being replaced rather than what was imported.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address PR #720 follow-up review findings

Make protective backup abort-on-failure (was best-effort console.error),
preserve nested syncedAt in fingerprint, use UTF-8 byte length for size
guard, throw on conflict-inspect failure so stale uploads can't leak
through, treat unreadable remote as changed, canonical-JSON signature
meta, and hold the version stamp on transient backup failures so the
retry path still fires.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address second-pass review findings on PR #720

- Hold version-change stamp when payload is non-meaningful (covers the
  startup vault-rehydrate race where a transient empty snapshot would
  permanently skip the upgrade backup).
- readBackupRecord stat-checks before readFile so an oversized file in
  the backup dir cannot OOM the renderer on enumeration.
- Reject maxBackups input outside 1..100 instead of silently clamping
  (matches the i18n error copy and the main-process sanitizer bound).
- Wrap USE_LOCAL conflict-resolution push in withRestoreBarrier so a
  concurrent auto-sync in another window cannot interleave.
- sha256Hex throws SyncSignatureUnavailableError on missing WebCrypto
  subtle; createSyncedFileSignature returns null, forcing the
  unreadable-remote → three-way-merge path instead of a weak
  length-only pseudo-signature.
- Document that array order in normalizePayloadForHash is an invariant
  enforced by producers, not the hash function.
- Drop three-way-merge completion logs from console.log to console.info.
- Comment the implicit restore → store-listener refresh chain so
  future refactors don't silently break the UI reload path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address third-pass review findings on PR #720

Resolves I-3 through I-8 and related cleanup items identified in the
deep review. Highlights:

- replace setTimeout(0) post-merge round-trip with a direct
  syncAllProviders call using the already-computed merged payload,
  removing the React-commit race
- resolve the empty-vault confirmation promise on unmount so a
  mid-dialog window teardown doesn't leak the resolver
- retry the version-change backup as hosts/keys hydrate, instead of
  latching on the first (possibly empty) snapshot
- heartbeat-refresh the cross-window restore barrier so long applies
  cannot expose a post-60s window to concurrent auto-sync
- add a diagnostic warning when connected providers hold divergent
  bases (multi-account configurations)
- surface a user-visible "Sync paused" toast when startup inspect
  fails, replacing the previous silent gate-open
- tie-break backup list sort by id when createdAt collides
- extract applyProtectedSyncPayload so the main and settings windows
  cannot drift on restore-barrier / protective-backup handling

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: address deep-review findings on PR #720

Deep re-review surfaced six Important issues that survived the prior
four review rounds. All are hardened here:

- I1: fsync the protective backup file AND its directory before the
  rename completes, so a system crash between backup creation and the
  restore it guards cannot leave a torn/zero-length safety net.
- I3: persist an apply-in-progress sentinel across the non-atomic
  localStorage writes in applySyncPayload. A crash mid-apply now
  surfaces on the next startup (toast + refuse auto-push) instead of
  silently pushing the half-applied state over an intact cloud copy.
- I2: only open the auto-sync gate (remoteCheckDoneRef) when the
  startup inspect validated cleanly. Add a bounded exponential-backoff
  retry so a transient inspect failure self-heals instead of wedging
  auto-sync until restart.
- I5: save the sync base BEFORE advancing the per-provider anchor
  inside uploadToProvider. A renderer crash between the two writes
  now degrades to "stale anchor forces re-inspect on next run," which
  re-merges against the fresh base — eliminating the silent
  base-drift window where a 3rd-device race could misclassify
  entries.
- I6: main process broadcasts a vaultBackups:changed IPC event on
  every mutation; useLocalVaultBackups subscribes so protective
  backups created from the main window show up in the Settings
  backup list without manual refresh.
- I4: update PR description + code comment to match the actual
  (safer) design: auto-sync gate opens on vault init, with
  hasMeaningfulSyncData + restore barrier preventing empty-push; the
  version-change backup is best-effort and retries as data hydrates.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: serialize startup checkRemoteVersion and stabilize its deps

Re-review flagged that checkRemoteVersion's useCallback depended on
`config` — a fresh object literal from App.tsx on every render — so
the retry effect restarted with attempt=0 on every vault edit and
could spawn overlapping in-flight inspect+apply runs. Two concurrent
commitRemoteInspection + onApplyPayload calls could race on the
apply-in-progress sentinel around interleaved writes.

Route `buildPayload`, `config.onApplyPayload`, and `config.startupReady`
through refs so checkRemoteVersion's identity no longer churns with
unrelated App state. Add an in-flight guard that returns early when a
previous invocation is still awaiting the network, closing the
same-window re-entry gap that withRestoreBarrier intentionally doesn't
cover.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: release in-flight lock on no-connected-provider early return

Third-pass review caught that `checkRemoteInFlightRef` was acquired
before the `!connectedProvider` check, so that early return leaked
the lock and every subsequent retry-timer tick silently no-op'd.
Move the acquisition past the early return so the only path that
takes the lock reaches the finally-release.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-15 03:09:55 +08:00

213 lines
8.4 KiB
JavaScript

import test from 'node:test';
import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
import { createSyncedFileSignature } from './syncSignature.js';
function makeSyncedFile(overrides = {}) {
const meta = {
version: 1,
updatedAt: 1_700_000_000_000,
deviceId: 'device-a',
deviceName: 'Device A',
appVersion: '1.0.0',
iv: 'BASE64_IV',
salt: 'BASE64_SALT',
algorithm: 'AES-256-GCM',
kdf: 'PBKDF2',
kdfIterations: 600000,
...(overrides.meta || {}),
};
return {
meta,
payload: overrides.payload ?? 'CIPHERTEXTxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx',
};
}
test('null file produces null signature', async () => {
assert.equal(await createSyncedFileSignature(null), null);
});
test('two identical files produce identical signatures', async () => {
const a = makeSyncedFile();
const b = makeSyncedFile();
assert.equal(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('signature is stable across meta key-insertion order', async () => {
const canonical = makeSyncedFile();
const shuffled = {
meta: {
kdf: 'PBKDF2',
salt: 'BASE64_SALT',
iv: 'BASE64_IV',
appVersion: '1.0.0',
deviceName: 'Device A',
deviceId: 'device-a',
updatedAt: 1_700_000_000_000,
version: 1,
algorithm: 'AES-256-GCM',
kdfIterations: 600000,
},
payload: canonical.payload,
};
assert.equal(await createSyncedFileSignature(canonical), await createSyncedFileSignature(shuffled));
});
test('changing iv flips the signature', async () => {
const a = makeSyncedFile();
const b = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { iv: 'DIFFERENT_IV' } });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('changing salt flips the signature', async () => {
const a = makeSyncedFile();
const b = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { salt: 'DIFFERENT_SALT' } });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('changing updatedAt flips the signature', async () => {
const a = makeSyncedFile();
const b = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { updatedAt: 1_700_000_000_001 } });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('changing algorithm flips the signature (v1 regression guard)', async () => {
// The old signature only hashed version/updatedAt/deviceId/iv/salt — an
// adapter could have changed algorithm/kdf while holding those constant.
// v2+ must reject that.
const a = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { algorithm: 'AES-256-GCM' } });
const b = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { algorithm: 'ChaCha20-Poly1305' } });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('changing kdf flips the signature (v1 regression guard)', async () => {
const a = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { kdf: 'PBKDF2' } });
const b = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { kdf: 'Argon2id' } });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('changing appVersion flips the signature (v1 regression guard)', async () => {
const a = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { appVersion: '1.0.0' } });
const b = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { appVersion: '2.0.0' } });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('changing payload ciphertext flips the signature even when meta matches', async () => {
// Critical: a malicious or buggy adapter could replay meta while swapping
// the ciphertext. v2+ must treat the payload as load-bearing.
const a = makeSyncedFile({ payload: 'AAA' + 'x'.repeat(60) });
const b = makeSyncedFile({ payload: 'BBB' + 'x'.repeat(60) });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('changing payload length flips the signature (truncation guard)', async () => {
// v3 hashes the full ciphertext — any length difference flips the signature.
const prefix = 'x'.repeat(64);
const a = makeSyncedFile({ payload: prefix });
const b = makeSyncedFile({ payload: `${prefix}extra` });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('tail-mutation of a long ciphertext flips the signature (v2 prefix-replay guard)', async () => {
// v2 only hashed the first 64 chars of the ciphertext. An adversary with
// write access to the remote could preserve the prefix and mutate only the
// tail, producing a signature collision. v3 hashes the full ciphertext and
// must catch tail mutations even when prefix + length are preserved.
const prefix = 'x'.repeat(64);
const tailA = 'AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA';
const tailB = 'BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB';
const a = makeSyncedFile({ payload: `${prefix}${tailA}` });
const b = makeSyncedFile({ payload: `${prefix}${tailB}` });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('deviceId alone is not sufficient to match (metadata weighted properly)', async () => {
// Both share deviceId but differ on iv — must not alias.
const a = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { deviceId: 'same', iv: 'IV_A' } });
const b = makeSyncedFile({ meta: { deviceId: 'same', iv: 'IV_B' } });
assert.notEqual(await createSyncedFileSignature(a), await createSyncedFileSignature(b));
});
test('missing optional meta fields hash as null rather than throwing', async () => {
const partial = {
meta: {
version: 1,
updatedAt: 1_700_000_000_000,
deviceId: 'device',
appVersion: '1.0.0',
iv: 'IV',
salt: 'S',
algorithm: 'AES-256-GCM',
kdf: 'PBKDF2',
// deviceName and kdfIterations omitted intentionally
},
payload: 'short',
};
const sig = await createSyncedFileSignature(partial);
assert.equal(typeof sig, 'string');
assert.ok(sig.startsWith('v3:'));
});
test('file with non-string payload produces signature with len=0', async () => {
// Defensive: if an adapter somehow yields a non-string payload, we still
// generate a well-formed signature rather than crashing.
const weird = { meta: makeSyncedFile().meta, payload: null };
const sig = await createSyncedFileSignature(weird);
assert.ok(sig);
assert.ok(sig.includes('len=0'));
assert.ok(sig.includes('sha256='));
});
test('signature contains a 64-char hex SHA-256 segment', async () => {
// Lock in the hash algorithm choice so a future regression to prefix-hashing
// is caught by this unit test.
const file = makeSyncedFile();
const sig = await createSyncedFileSignature(file);
assert.ok(sig);
const match = sig.match(/sha256=([a-f0-9]+)/);
assert.ok(match, `expected sha256=<hex> in signature, got ${sig}`);
assert.equal(match[1].length, 64);
});
test('v2-format anchor string does not equal a v3 signature', async () => {
// Migration guard: if a user's localStorage carries a v2-prefixed anchor
// from a previous build, comparing against a fresh v3 signature must flip
// to "remote changed" so we re-observe rather than treating a stale anchor
// as authoritative.
const file = makeSyncedFile();
const v3 = await createSyncedFileSignature(file);
const v2Like = String(v3).replace(/^v3:/, 'v2:').replace(/sha256=[a-f0-9]+$/, 'head=xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx');
assert.notEqual(v3, v2Like);
});
test('missing WebCrypto subtle → signature is null (fail-closed, no weak fallback)', async () => {
// Earlier revisions returned `nosha-<length>` when subtle.digest was
// unavailable. That fallback was length-only, so an adversary
// controlling the remote could trivially produce a payload whose
// weak pseudo-signature equals a legitimate v3 signature of the
// same length. Failing to `null` routes decideRemoteChanged into the
// "unreadable remote → treat as changed → three-way merge" path,
// which is strictly safer.
//
// `globalThis.crypto` is a read-only getter in Node, so we override
// the `subtle` property on the existing object rather than
// reassigning the whole binding.
const subtleDescriptor = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(globalThis.crypto, 'subtle');
Object.defineProperty(globalThis.crypto, 'subtle', {
configurable: true,
get() {
return undefined;
},
});
try {
const sig = await createSyncedFileSignature(makeSyncedFile());
assert.equal(sig, null, 'missing subtle must not produce a weak fallback string');
} finally {
if (subtleDescriptor) {
Object.defineProperty(globalThis.crypto, 'subtle', subtleDescriptor);
} else {
delete globalThis.crypto.subtle;
}
}
});