Files
Netcatty/application/vaultCsvExportCredentials.test.ts
T
陈大猫 904af93a1d fix(credentials): 防止解密失败后二次加密污染本地与云端 (#2702) (#2770)
* fix(credentials): stop double-encrypting undecryptable safeStorage blobs

When local decrypt failed (e.g. OSCrypt key churn after reboot), encrypt
used to wrap the leftover enc:v1 ciphertext again, permanently poisoning
the vault. Startup sync could also push those placeholders to cloud and
make download restore the same poison.

- Keep real enc:v1 blobs unchanged on encrypt (header check, no wrap)
- Strip device-bound placeholders when applying portable sync payloads
- Guard startup local-wins / merge round-trips before upload
- Skip vault init re-encrypt writes when secrets are still undecrypted

Fixes #2702

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): strip enc:v1 secrets from smart-merge uploads

Bugbot found that after local apply sanitized placeholders, legacy v1
smart-merge could still decrypt an unstripped remote, merge it, and
re-upload the poison. Strip device-bound credentials on remote decrypt
and again on the merged payload before upload.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P2 review on #2702

- Always re-encrypt vault init batches so plaintext siblings are not
  left unprotected when one record is a stale enc:v1 placeholder
- Sanitize device-bound secrets before convergent restore prepare so
  CRDT replica commit matches vault import
- Require a complete safeStorage blob (header + min 31 bytes) before
  treating enc:v1 as ciphertext; encrypt header-only coincidences

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P1 review on #2702

- Decode enc:v1 payloads with atob in the renderer-safe domain helper
- Heal poisoned remote secrets from local/base before smart-merge so
  good credentials are not discarded as remote-only deletions
- Keep post-merge strip so leftover enc:v1 never uploads

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): address Codex P1 CBC min and startup heal

- Accept 19-byte v10/v11 CBC OSCrypt blobs (not only 31-byte GCM)
- Heal poisoned remote secrets before startup smart-merge
- Strip unresolved placeholders on merge round-trip upload

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): sanitize payloads at every apply/commit boundary

Codex P1: vault apply stripped enc:v1 while commitRemoteInspection and
convergent materialization could keep the poison. Sanitize merged/remote
payloads before apply+base commit, strip on CRDT materialization, and
sanitize convergent apply inputs.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): heal local and remote secrets before smart-merge

Smart-merge could select a locally-changed entity whose only secret
delta was enc:v1 poison, then strip and upload empty secrets. Heal
both sides from the opposite payload/base before merge on all sync
paths.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): keep enc:v1 intact during convergent materialize

Stripping device-bound secrets inside materializeSyncPayloadFromConvergentState
broke envelope validation for poisoned-but-consistent v2 snapshots, so decrypt
could not hydrate the clouds #2702 needs to recover. Portable stripping stays
at apply/upload boundaries.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): detect Windows DPAPI by decoded header bytes

Real DPAPI blobs start with 01 00 00 00 d0 8c... and base64-encode as
AQAAANCM..., so the previous AQAAAA string prefix rejected them and
allowed double-wrapping after key rotation. Match decoded headers in
both the main-process bridge and renderer predicate.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* test(credentials): use complete enc:v1 fixtures for stricter detector

Short placeholders like enc:v1:djEwAAAA no longer pass the platform
header + minimum-size checks. Update auth/SFTP/proxy/sync fixtures to
full v10-shaped blobs so npm test matches production validation.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(sync): treat preferred credential deletions as authoritative

When healing enc:v1 before merge, an empty/missing secret on a present
preferred entity is an intentional clear and must not be revived from
base. Only fall back to base when preferred is absent or also poisoned.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): reject impossible v10/v11 ciphertext lengths

Accept only CBC-aligned sizes (19+16n) or GCM-sized blobs (>=31) so
coincidental enc:v1 plaintext of intermediate length is encrypted instead
of treated as an undecryptable placeholder.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(credentials): require full DPAPI provider GUID signature

Accept Windows safeStorage blobs only when they start with version
01 00 00 00 plus provider GUID df9d8cd0-1501-11d1-8c7a-00c04fc297eb,
so coincidental 01 00 00 00 prefixes are not treated as ciphertext.

Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: 陈大猫 <binaricat@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-06 13:17:24 +08:00

160 lines
5.6 KiB
TypeScript

import assert from "node:assert/strict";
import test from "node:test";
import type { Host, SSHKey } from "../domain/models";
import { STORAGE_KEY_DEFAULT_KEY_PASSPHRASES } from "../infrastructure/config/storageKeys";
import { buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions } from "./vaultCsvExportCredentials";
function installEmptyLocalStorage(t: test.TestContext): Map<string, string> {
const storage = new Map<string, string>();
Object.defineProperty(globalThis, "localStorage", {
configurable: true,
value: {
getItem: (key: string) => storage.get(key) ?? null,
setItem: (key: string, value: string) => storage.set(key, value),
},
});
Object.defineProperty(globalThis, "window", {
configurable: true,
value: { netcatty: undefined },
});
t.after(() => {
Reflect.deleteProperty(globalThis, "localStorage");
Reflect.deleteProperty(globalThis, "window");
});
return storage;
}
const host = (identityFileId?: string): Host => ({
id: "host-1",
label: "Host",
hostname: "host.example.com",
port: 22,
identityFileId,
identityFilePaths: identityFileId ? undefined : ["/Users/alice/.ssh/id_ed25519"],
authMethod: "key",
});
const referenceKey = (overrides: Partial<SSHKey> = {}): SSHKey => ({
id: "key-1",
label: "id_ed25519",
type: "ED25519",
category: "key",
source: "reference",
filePath: "/Users/alice/.ssh/id_ed25519",
privateKey: "",
created: 1,
...overrides,
});
test("CSV credentials prefer a readable reference-key passphrase without a false warning", async () => {
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host("key-1")],
[referenceKey({ savePassphrase: true, passphrase: "key-secret" })],
async () => ({ values: [], unreadable: true, present: true }),
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrasesById.get("key-1"), "key-secret");
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 0);
});
test("CSV credentials preserve legacy reference-key passphrases without a save flag", async () => {
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host("key-1")],
[referenceKey({ passphrase: "legacy-secret" })],
async () => ({ values: [], unreadable: false, present: false }),
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrasesById.get("key-1"), "legacy-secret");
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 0);
});
test("CSV credentials do not use stale path storage for an uninitialized legacy reference key", async () => {
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host("key-1")],
[referenceKey()],
async () => ({ values: ["stale-secret"], unreadable: false, present: true }),
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrasesById.has("key-1"), false);
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 0);
});
test("CSV credentials include a matching Keychain passphrase for a direct key path", async (t) => {
installEmptyLocalStorage(t);
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host()],
[referenceKey({ savePassphrase: true, passphrase: "keychain-secret" })],
);
assert.equal(
result.keyPassphrases.get("/Users/alice/.ssh/id_ed25519"),
"keychain-secret",
);
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 0);
});
test("CSV credentials exclude an explicitly unsaved Keychain passphrase for a direct key path", async (t) => {
const storage = installEmptyLocalStorage(t);
storage.set(STORAGE_KEY_DEFAULT_KEY_PASSPHRASES, JSON.stringify({
"/Users/alice/.ssh/id_ed25519": "stale-side-secret",
}));
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host()],
[referenceKey({ savePassphrase: false, passphrase: "stale-secret" })],
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrases.has("/Users/alice/.ssh/id_ed25519"), false);
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 0);
});
test("CSV credentials warn when a saved reference-key passphrase cannot be read", async () => {
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host("key-1")],
[referenceKey({ savePassphrase: true, passphrase: "enc:v1:djEwYWJjAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA==" })],
async () => ({ values: [], unreadable: false, present: false }),
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrasesById.has("key-1"), false);
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 1);
});
test("CSV credentials never fall back to stale path storage for an unsaved reference key", async () => {
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host("key-1")],
[referenceKey({ savePassphrase: false })],
async () => ({ values: ["stale-secret"], unreadable: false, present: true }),
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrasesById.has("key-1"), false);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrases.has("/Users/alice/.ssh/id_ed25519"), false);
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 0);
});
test("CSV credentials use readable path storage only when a reference key is marked saved", async () => {
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host("key-1")],
[referenceKey({ savePassphrase: true })],
async () => ({ values: ["side-store-secret"], unreadable: false, present: true }),
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrasesById.get("key-1"), "side-store-secret");
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 0);
});
test("CSV credentials omit ambiguous path storage and warn", async () => {
for (const read of [
{ values: ["stale-secret"], unreadable: true, present: true },
{ values: ["old-secret", "new-secret"], unreadable: false, present: true },
]) {
const result = await buildVaultCsvCredentialOptions(
[host("key-1")],
[referenceKey({ savePassphrase: true })],
async () => read,
);
assert.equal(result.keyPassphrasesById.has("key-1"), false);
assert.equal(result.unreadablePassphraseCount, 1);
}
});